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Calls Depend On What Others KnowAfter a wild chimpanzee encounters a model of a dangerous snake, whether or
not he gives an alarm call depends on his perception of another individual’s
knowledge.Robert M. Seyfarth
and Dorothy L. Cheney
Birds and mammals do not always give
alarm calls when they see a predator.
Instead, alarm call production is
affected by the presence and
composition of an audience. Animals
are more likely to give alarm calls when
they are near other conspecifics than
when they are alone, and more likely to
give alarm calls in the presence of kin
and preferred companions than in the
presence of non-kin or rivals. To date,
however, there has been no evidence
that calling also depends on the
signaler’s perception of whether
recipients are ignorant or already
informed about the presence of
danger. Indeed, whether any animal
is even capable of making this
distinction — whether any animal has a
‘theory ofmind’—has been the subject
of considerable debate. In this issue
of Current Biology, Catherine
Crockford, Roman Wittig, and
colleagues [1] describe the results of
a field experiment suggesting that
chimpanzees recognize when others
are ignorant about the presence of
danger and adjust their alarm calls
accordingly.
Many field experiments have shown
that, when producing vocalizations,non-human primates take into account
subtle contingencies, including the
context, the recipient’s identity,
the identity of others nearby, and the
nature of their own recent interactions
with their recipient and the recipient’s
kin [2–5]. Despite this broad
sensitivity, monkeys and apes
generally seem inattentive to the one
feature that underlies much human
communication: the perception of
another individual’s knowledge and
beliefs [6]. The issue, however, is
fraught with methodological
complications [7].
Searching for a theory of mind in
animals is difficult because intentions
and beliefs are usually correlated with
behavior, making it hard to determine
whether one animal is attending to
another’s behavior or her mental state.
Research on children, moreover, has
shown that having a theory of mind is
not an all-or-nothing phenomenon:
before the age of two, children
recognize that others have likes,
dislikes, and motives, but the same
children cannot distinguish between
what they believe and what others
believe. Like young children, animals
may have a partially developed theory
of mind. Several studies, for example,
have shown that animals are sensitive
to other individuals’ direction of gazeand behavioral intentions. However,
there is little convincing evidence that
any animals — including in particular
chimpanzees — can attribute
knowledge states to others.
Experiments that attempt to address
this question in primates [8–10] are
difficult to evaluate because of the
artificial settings in which they are
conducted, the involvement of
humans, and repeated testing of
the same individuals.
In the wild, chimpanzees form
temporary parties that fluctuate in size
and composition throughout the day
[11,12]. This ‘fission–fusion’ society
would seem to provide an ideal setting
for the evolution of a theory of mind.
Some individuals can acquire
knowledge that others do not have and
‘decide’ whether to share it or not;
others, meanwhile, must determine
who knows what.
As they followed a lone chimpanzee
in the Budongo Forest of Uganda,
Crockford and colleagues [1] guessed
where it was about to go and placed in
its path a stuffed model of either
a Gaboon viper or a rhinoceros viper,
two highly poisonous snakes. They
then waited until — with luck — the
subject discovered the snake and then
recorded its vocal behavior as — with
more luck — other chimpanzees
(termed ‘receivers’) approached
the area.
Subjects were classified as having
no prior knowledge about the snake or
having some prior knowledge, either
because they had already seen the
snake or they had been within 50 m
when an earlier discoverer had
produced an ‘alert hoo’ in response
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states were classified from the
perspective of the subject as: ignorant
(the subject did not see the receiver
see the snake and did not hear a hoo
when the receiver was within 50 m);
partially knowledgeable (the subject
did not see the receiver see the snake
but heard a hoo when the receiver was
within 50 m); or fully knowledgeable
(the subject saw the receiver see the
snake). This classification will make
some readers uneasy, as it claims
insight into the subject’s mind. In
justification, the authors point out that
in the vast majority of cases both the
subject and the receiver had some
knowledge of the snake through shared
experience. Under these conditions,
it is perhaps not unreasonable for the
authors to assume that subjects had
some first-hand knowledge of
receivers’ prior interactions and hence
receivers’ knowledge.
As it turned out, the subject’s and the
receiver’s information about the snake
were positively correlated, though by
no means always alike. Consequently,
these two potential predictors of the
subject’s behavior could not be
tested in the same statistical model.
Crockford and colleagues [1] therefore
tested them in separate models, with
two measures of hoo production as
responses. Both models yielded
significant results, suggesting that
one or more predictors could account
for subjects’ behavior. Further
analysis was therefore conducted to
disentangle the effects of subject and
receiver information.
The authors focused on a subset of
cases in which receivers either already
had precise information about the
snake’s location (because they had
seen it) or had only partial information
(because they had heard a hoo but not
yet seen the snake). To control for the
subject’s possible habituation to the
stimulus, they included as a potential
predictor the duration of time since the
subject had seen the snake. The results
showed that the primary factor
affecting the subject’s calling behavior
was whether the receiver was fully or
only partially knowledgeable about the
snake’s location, and not the subject’s
own risk or habituation to the stimulus.
Subjects called more if the receiver had
not seen the snake and least if the
receiver had. In a final, intriguing twist,
subjects were also more likely to call
if they shared a close social bond with
the receiver. Although this observationsupports previous findings that strong,
enduring social bonds play a major role
in the lives of chimpanzees [13], it also
complicates matters, because it
suggests that a chimpanzee who
recognizes another’s ignorance may
nonetheless not choose to warn that
individual. Failure to inform cannot,
therefore, be taken as proof of a lack
of a theory of mind.
This important paper [1] reminds us
that, while experiments with captive
animals can be criticized for their
artificiality, field experiments have
their liabilities, too. They are
time-consuming (the study took
20 months to complete) and beset by
ambiguity, relying on complicated
statistics for theirdenouement. There is
simply no way around this problem.
The attribution of knowledge to
another, if it exists at all in animals, has
evolved in the context of a rich network
of social interactions where many
different behaviors and memories of
past events are correlated with each
other. Psychologists who study theory
of mind in children can easily create
situations that both preserve the
richness of their subjects’ social lives
and isolate crucial experimental
variables. For those who study animals
in the wild the task is much more
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MyosinDirectional transport of specific cargos is tuned to specific molecular motors
and specific cytoskeletal tracks. Myosin V transports its cargo on actin cables,
whereas kinesin or dynein transport their cargo on microtubules. A recent
study shows that an engineered kinesin can substitute for myosin V and its
cargo-specific transport and subsequent cellular functions.Kathleen Scheffler1
and Phong T. Tran1,2,*
Cell polarity and shape are defined
by the cytoskeleton, which can serve
as tracks for intracellular trafficking of
organelles, vesicles and molecules.
Distinct roles for the microtubule
and actin cytoskeletons in theestablishment and maintenance of
polarized growth have been described
in diverse cell types [1,2]. Budding
yeast relies on an actin-based delivery
of secretory vesicles to the forming
bud, whereas filamentous fungi appear
to use microtubules as the major
transport system to direct polarized
cell growth [3]. Mammalian cells, such
